Category: Leaders

The Arab Kingdom

Amid the chaos of the First World War, a new pan-Arab empire was proclaimed. It faltered, but its historical lessons remain.

In December 2022, Abdullah II, the king of Jordan, gave an interview to the CNN anchor Becky Anderson. Sitting close to the Jordan River, not far from where Jesus is believed to have been baptised, this Muslim ruler expressed his concerns about the status of Jerusalem and the Christians under pressure from the new, extremist Israeli government. He emphasised that the ‘Hashemites’, his family, are the custodians of both Christian and Muslim sites in the holy city. Abdullah II cited his great-great-grandfather Sharif Hussein. It was from Hussein’s time, sometime at the end of the First World War, according to Abdullah II, that the Hashemite custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy sites originates. His ancestor even gave sanctuary to Christian Armenian refugees in Jordan, said the king proudly on CNN.

Abdullah II’s remarks presented him as a confident and reassuring monarch but they also refer to a history of modern Arab kingship and the modern Middle East that has mostly been forgotten. Wikipedia in English, for instance, tells us that the custodianship of the Muslim sites in Jerusalem by the Hashemites follows from a ‘verbal agreement’ of Hussein with the Supreme Muslim Council of Palestine in 1924. The Indonesian version of Wikipedia repeats the claims of the English article. The Arabic version, however, tells us about the financial help Hussein gave for restoring the holy sites of Jerusalem and subsequent donations by the Hashemite dynasty for further improvements to the holy city. So, who was Hussein and what’s his relevance today?

Sharif Hussein is a legendary figure of the 1910s and ’20s. For some – certainly for Abdullah II – Hussein was the nationalist leader of the ‘Arab revolt’ during the First World War who won the war for the Arabs. In an alliance with Britain, he revolted against the Ottoman Empire in 1916 in order to establish a giant independent state that he called the ‘Arab Kingdom’. Others see him in less heroic terms. They blame him for ‘stabbing the Ottomans in the back’, the inability to stop the partitions decided by Europeans, and the Zionist settlement of Palestine – so, in a way, for losing the war.

The importance of Hussein and his Arab Kingdom for today is a forgotten experiment with state-formation exactly 100 years ago. Modern states do not originate only from nationalism. Abdullah II’s remarks at the Jordan River evoke Islam as a principle of government and Muslim rulers as protectors of Christians. This use of Islam is very different from what we usually hear about religion in the Middle East – for instance, ‘sectarianism’ (religion-based claims to institutionalised representation within nation states, often erupting in violence) or the fascist brutality of ISIS. But neither should we follow the king of Jordan into a monarchist-nationalist nostalgia. His great-great-grandfather Hussein was not born a nationalist. Here, I tell Hussein’s story as an exercise in unearthing ideas about Muslim government that we can call ‘imperial’. This is important because the imperial techniques of state-making defined the early 20th century in many regions of the world, and not nationalist or egalitarian revolutions.

Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali was the scion of an important family from the sacred city of Mecca. Sharif means ‘nobleman’. Individuals who claim that they are descendants of the Prophet Muhammad use the Arabic honorific terms sharif (plural ashraf) and sayyid (meaning ‘master’, plural sada). Tens of millions of Muslims today claim this heritage. Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi dictator until 2003, was one of them, for example. The rulers of Morocco, too, are ashraf. (The Saudi kings are emphatically not.) Furthermore, among all ashraf and sada, only the Jordanian ruling family and their relatives are called ‘Hashemites’ publicly, after Hashim, a legendary ancestor of the Prophet Muhammad. So, yes, both Hussein and his great-great-grandson King Abdullah II, sitting next to the Jordan River talking to CNN, are also ashraf, descendants of the Prophet.

Panoramic view of Mecca, c1845. Courtesy the Khalili Collections

Yet Hussein was born not in Mecca, but in Istanbul, at the metropolitan centre of the Ottoman Empire, sometime in the 1850s. The Ottoman Empire, a vast, three-continental administration in Europe, Asia and Africa, existed roughly between the 14th century and 1922. This empire was the Mediterranean Muslim superpower. The Ottoman emperor – sultan – assumed the title of the caliph of (Sunni) Islam, too. Today, in its final former territory across Europe and Asia, we find the states of Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt, Libya and Tunis in North Africa. In 1914, at the threshold of the First World War, its directly ruled population was estimated at around 25 million (at that time, the US population was about 100 million; Austria-Hungary was about 50 million).

For the Ottomans (a non-Arab, Turkic Muslim imperial dynasty), the most important ashraf were those in Mecca and Medina, the sacred cities in the Hijaz region of Arabia. Hence the value of Sharif Hussein bin ‘Ali for this Muslim empire. The loyalty of the Meccan descendants of the Prophet meant the symbolic recognition of the Ottoman caliphate. Since their conquest in the early 16th century, the Ottoman sultans usually appointed a sharif to serve as the emir of Mecca, its local ruler. From the mid-19th century, the descendants of the Prophet became closer and closer to Istanbul, literally. Hussein was born in Istanbul because his family branch in exile competed for the emirate of the holy city. He knew Turkish, his wife was Turkish-speaking, and his sons received Ottoman education. Hussein, known in the Ottoman administration as Şerif Ali Paşazade Hüseyin Bey (in Turkish transliteration), became quite an Ottomanised descendant of the Prophet.

The logic of the time was not to create nation-states but to transform empires into looser organisations

From the 1870s, the descendants of the Prophet received political roles in the Ottoman imperial capital. Many other more ordinary Arabs from the provinces also became part of the modernising imperial bureaucracy. Hussein and his sons (and the rival sharifian Meccan family members), circulating between Mecca and Istanbul, benefitted from this modern experiment fusing Islam with imperial patriotism. It’s helpful to think of this as an ‘unelected system of representation’, for the sultan suspended the imperial constitution in 1878 and substituted the parliament with these new practices. The ashraf ‘represented’ their regions (in a way, Hussein’s family stood for Mecca and the Hijaz region) but also in general the Muslim community. Many ashraf sat on imperial councils, travelled on steamships and the new railway lines, and so provided a symbolic cover for the empire. After the coup d’état usually known as the Young Turk Revolution to restore the constitution in 1908, Hussein’s sons became elected members of the new imperial assembly. And from 1908, Hussein held the imperial office of the emir of Mecca.

Being a descendant of the Prophet and an Ottoman imperial notable was a uniquely powerful combination in a city where a growing number of Muslims from all over the world came to perform pilgrimage in the age of steam. No wonder that the European empires (with large Muslim colonies and domains) were keen on gaining Hussein’s attention, and Hussein was also keen to gain their attention, especially the British. Hussein had been loyal to the Ottoman Empire before 1908 but hated the Young Turks and the restored Ottoman constitution. He thought that the Quran should be the only constitution in the empire; and he also feared losing his position as emir of the holy city. In the 1910s, Hussein and his sons made cautious contact with the British consul in Cairo. Intriguing, in early 1914 Hussein’s son Abdullah asked the British consul to consider a British protectorate over the emirate of Mecca like the British did with the subdued Afghan emir.

This 1914 intrigue of the Ottoman ashraf of Mecca in order to switch empires was part of a much more complex momentum of imperial transformation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea. We must understand that the logic of the time, despite the popularity of ethnicity- and language-based patriotic ideas, was not to create sovereign nation-states but to transform empires somehow into looser organisations.

By the 1910s, many faith- and ethnicity-based groups in the Ottoman Empire demanded reforms to transform the empire into a federation. Bourgeois Arabs were no exception as some Syrians started to imagine a decentralised Ottoman Empire with Arab autonomy. Other Arab groups – for instance, the religious entrepreneur-journalist Sheikh Rashid Rida and his activists, with some European encouragement – imagined a new empire as a Muslim association of emirs, and some other sheikhs even advocated for an Arab caliph instead of an Ottoman one. In many of these 1910s plans, the ashraf had a role and Hussein, as the ruler of Mecca, personally could expect a potential caliphate. European commentators imagined this would-be Arab caliphate as a type of papacy, restricted to the holy cities in the Hijaz. This would have ended the age-old Ottoman system of combining the emperor and caliph titles. In short, the spirit of the time was to create autonomous polities in some sort of federation as a better way to accommodate economic and political demands of ethnic groups, and to challenge the Ottoman leadership of Sunni Islam.

A flag of Hijaz, also known as the flag of the Arab revolt, presented by Sharif Hussein, King of Hijaz, to King George V of the United Kingdom in 1918. Courtesy the Royal Collection, London

And in October 1914, the Ottoman Empire joined the Great War as a member of the Central Powers. Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans fought together against the Allied Powers, the British-French-Russian alliance. The Ottoman caliph declared jihad on the Allied Powers (not, to be noted, on his own Central Power allies, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians). For the Allied Powers, Hussein, the emir of Mecca, was the most useful symbol against the Ottoman caliph. As a descendant of the Prophet, as an Arab, he was a potential challenger of the Ottoman claim to the caliphate (and, for the better, this emir of Mecca had already requested British protection). After an exchange of letters with the British High Commissioner in Cairo (this correspondence came to be known as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence), Hussein declared his revolt – the ‘Arab revolt’ – against the Ottoman government in June 1916. Ever since, there has been a debate over what the British promised exactly, what a promise means in informal diplomacy, and whether the British betrayed their promises later.

Bedouin Arabs with the flag of Hijaz during the Arab Revolt in 1917. Courtesy the Library of Congress

Despite the assurances about a large Arab polity in the correspondence with McMahon, no Allied planners really expected that the emir of Mecca would want something more than a small emirate with the holy cities in the Hijaz. When, in October 1916, Hussein and his sons announced their claim to a giant polity, with Hussein as ‘King of the Arabs’, it took the Allied Powers by surprise. The ‘Arab Kingdom’ was an idea about a new empire stretching from the Levant (what is today Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon) to the Iraqi regions, even Arabia, thus including most of the Arabic-speaking Asian Ottoman provinces (but not the North African ones). Overcoming their surprise, in January 1917 and later repeatedly, the Allied Powers recognised Hussein as king only over the Hijaz, a small portion of Arabia. But this new ruler and his sons were not satisfied with a kingdom of the Hijaz. They maintained their claims to a much larger state, a new Muslim-Arab empire. This is why, when the sharifian troops entered Ottoman Damascus in October 1918 under the orders of his second son Faisal, many Damascenes understood that they are now in the ‘Arab Kingdom’, being the subjects of Hussein, a new Muslim sultan.

Empire is often a rhetorical term to mean something evil. Think about the empire in Star Wars. But we historians use ‘empire’ as an historical-analytical category of government, whose organising logic differs from the ideal of the nation-state. Empire is a large organisation that uses all available means (violence, dynastic marriage, religion and ethnicity) to establish political and economic claims on diverse regions with diverse peoples. As Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper call to our attention, empires welcome and embrace ‘diversity’; it is nation-states that require a homogeneous population. Historical empires subjugated and colonised peoples, but the important issue for our purposes is that empire is a different way of subjugating and organising peoples from that of the nation-state.

At the end of the Great War, the political visions about the future of what became the Middle East – the Allied agreements about partition, the well-known 1917 British promise of Palestine to Zionists as ‘the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people’, Hussein’s Arab Kingdom, some bourgeois Syrian federative visions, and the very much existing Ottoman loyalists – were not about sovereign nation-states. These plans and visions all implied some type of empire. Perhaps, the most fitting for post-Ottoman Arabs was a federative polity, with or without a dynasty. The imperial logic of organising peoples and territories dictated the political imaginations up to about 1922.

During 1918 and 1919, the sharifian advocates of the Arab Kingdom projected Islam and Arab ethnicity as the founding norms of a new political order. From early 1918, the official journal in Mecca and his sons called Hussein ‘the Commander of the Faithful’ in Arabic (amir al-mu’minin) while the new king craved for the title of caliph. Both the sharifian and British propaganda started to advertise Prophetic descent as an important quality for Muslim rulership. The Arab Kingdom was to be ruled by Hussein and his sons, the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad. Islam, Prophetic genealogy and ethnicity were to serve as the constitutional foundations of Hussein’s Arab Kingdom. We can call this idea of a state a ‘genealogical empire’.

Using religion in state-formation is considered today outside of international norms

Hussein’s genealogical empire was the first of many post-Ottoman Muslim imperial projects in the 20th century. Like the case with Christian, Hebrew and Buddhist imperialisms, there had been various kinds of Muslim empires in history, from the late-antique Muslim-Byzantian caliphates to the last great empires of the Mughals in India, the Qajars in Iran, and the Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean. In a way, the Arab Kingdom was to contain recycled Ottoman institutions: the caliphate, a monarchy, Islam, the ashraf, and of course the ex-Ottoman peoples, such as Arabs, Turks, Armenians, Jews and Kurds, some of whom were Christians and even Shi‘i Muslims. The Ottoman politics of diversity had to be transformed into a new Muslim framework.

Using religion in state-formation is considered today outside of international norms. In 1919, the sharifian makers of the Arab Kingdom had to face the Ottoman Arab urban bourgeoisie who were rather advocating some type of federation, perhaps preserving an association even with Istanbul. For instance, in Ottoman Damascus, the sharifian occupiers had to compromise for a constitutional, federative ‘United States of Syria’, in which Faisal, the son of Hussein, was declared king in March 1920. But Sharif Hussein was not a federalist. In his imagination, this unrecognised Syrian princely polity was still part of his larger Arab Kingdom.

Next to the Arab federalists and the still-strong Ottoman loyalists, the sharifian imperial project also bumped into the intentions of the Allied Powers. This is the more familiar story about the modern Middle East. The French and British (and Russian and Italian) governments aimed at partitioning the Ottoman provinces. Just think about the Balfour Declaration in 1917, given by Britain’s foreign minister Lord Balfour to the Zionists to establish a ‘national home for the Jewish people’ in Ottoman Palestine, practically a promise for settler colonisation, a typical imperial gesture. The Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 codified these agreements in the new international system. Hussein remained to be recognised only as the king of the Hijaz. There thus existed in 1919 a split situation – while the ‘Kingdom of the Hijaz’ was a minor Allied Power and as such participated in the Paris Peace Conference, the Hijazi (sharifian) representatives and administrators in the occupied regions projected the idea of the ‘Arab Kingdom’ with full force.

And even more complicated was the fact that Hussein’s polity was to be a subordinate to the British Empire. For instance, Hussein had no problem with a British appointment of his minister of war and often repeated that the British gave him power over lesser rulers in Arabia. Even more importantly, the British treasury financed the Hijazi (the sharifian) army and their occupation administration in Damascus, and in December 1919 the British government gave over the financing of this occupation zone to the French treasury. The French army did not trust Faisal, a would-be sharifian monarch in Damascus, who was too closely tied with his father Sharif Hussein, a potential caliph in Mecca, and with British politics. Besides, the French colonial empire had their own sharifian monarch in Morocco. In July 1920, the French army invaded the internal lands of Syria, expulsing the Hijazi sharifian regime and Faisal, the new king of the United States of Syria, and killed the Ottoman Syrian general Yusuf al-Azma. Thus, accidentally, the French army also ended the hopes of the local Syrian Ottoman loyalists about returning to Istanbul’s umbrella.

The possibility of a large Arab kingdom was not yet crushed as sharifian troops still held the Ottoman Hijaz railway stations in Transjordan, the mountains above the river Jordan. This is where Hussein’s third son Abdullah arrived in November 1920 to represent his father and establish his own emirate within the sharifian empire. The British planners agreed to this arrangement in April 1921 and at the same time transferred the defeated Faisal to rule a new country, the Iraqi kingdom. Thus emerged a chain of sharifian monarchies (the Kingdom of the Hijaz, the Emirate of Transjordan, the Kingdom of Iraq) in a loose association, under British control. This modular association of three Muslim rulers was still an empire, with Mecca as its centre. In 1921, British officials were astounded when Sharif Abdullah presented them with a constitutional draft of his new emirate that derived his authority over Amman from his father, Sharif Hussein, in Mecca. The operation of recycling the Ottoman Empire into a series of emirates held together by Prophetic genealogy, Islam, ethnicity, a railway, and dynastic claims was the defining project of the Middle East until 1924.

Abdullah II’s remarks today about the Hashemite protection of Christians and Jerusalem’s holy places originate in this moment and in this project. Muslim emperors had offered protection to persecuted communities in the past, and possibly Sharif Hussein was also glad to exercise this imperial gesture when his troops found Christian Armenian refugees in the occupied Syrian provinces. Furthermore, as a potential ruler of Jerusalem and a caliph – in fact, in March 1924 he did assume the caliphate in public – Hussein and his sons got in touch with the Jerusalem Muslim, Christian and Jewish communities. A Jerusalem delegation arrived in Amman in March 1924 to acknowledge Sharif Hussein as caliph (and another Jerusalem group to anxiously express their doubts). About this time, the Hashemites started to act as protectors of the holy sites in a symbolic competition (but also cooperation) with interwar Zionists.

But the core of the imagined Arab Kingdom – Mecca and the Hijaz – was gone by the end of 1925. Capitalising on the general dissatisfaction with King Hussein’s politics, a new conqueror, Sultan Abdulaziz of Najd in Central Arabia (‘Ibn Saud’) conquered the holy cities and expulsed the sharifian family. A new, this time Saudi, kingdom started in the Hijaz. King Hussein lived in exile – he was pointedly buried in Jerusalem near the Al-Aqsa mosque in 1931. So, when today Abdullah II claims protection over the holy sites, in fact he also claims his own ancestor’s grave.

In this story about the rise and fall of the sharifian Arab Kingdom – although never entirely gone, as Jordan is still with us – we have observed that religion, genealogy, federative ideas, ethnicity and monarchy were fundamental in the local making of modern Arab polities. While the Allied Powers partitioned peoples and regions, there was significant local involvement in the political furnishing of new states. The mixture of constituent fictions was not created by the Allied occupiers; instead, it emerged from how societies that succeeded the old Ottoman order continued to carry out imperial programmes in lieu of radical revolutions. At the same time, these successor societies were to be integrated into new European imperial orders, Greater France and Greater Britain, respectively. Western and Arab politicians, Orientalists, artists and the press further entrenched the essentialisation, racialisation and feudalisation of post-Ottoman Arabs in the 1920s and ’30s. The local and external logics of the imperial imaginary about Arab politics with its centrality on religion retained their force well into the second half of the 20th century, and, as we could observe in Abdullah II’s interview to CNN, even until today.

source/content: aeon.co / Adam Hestyan / edited Sam Haselby (headline edited)

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Sharif Husein and the campaign for a modern Arab empire

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ARAB

SAUDI ARABIA / EGYPT: Sayeda Zeinab – The story of the ‘chief of el-Diwan’ (6- 62 hijri)

In the heart of Historic Cairo, the mausoleum and mosque of Sayeda Zeinab (6-62 hijri), the granddaughter of the Prophet Muhammad, centres the square and district that holds her name.

Sayeda Zeinab is known among Egyptians as Om Hashim (Hashim’s mother) since she was the one who took care of the wounded and martyred members of her tribe during the battle of Karbala. She is also known as El-Tahra (The Pure) and as ” Om El-Awagez” (mother of the disabled) because she attended to elderly and disabled women. Egyptians also know her by the title El-Mushira (The One to Consult) and Raeisat El-Diwan (The chief of diwan) because she opened her house for the people who sought her guidance and proclaimed her the head of her diwan of spiritual guidance.

Born in the sixth year of Hijra in Madina, this bright and beautiful girl was known for her sound mind and intellect and was often referred to as Aqilat Bani Hashem (The sound mind of the tribe of Bani Hashim).

She got married and had four boys and two girls. She became known for her gatherings on Islamic jurisprudence, where she shared her knowledge. She lived a simple, pious life until she witnessed the harshest moments in Islamic History.

In Aisha Abdel-Rahman’s book titled Al-Saida Zeinab Aqilat Bani Hashim, published in 1985 by Dar El-Ketab El-Araby, she was described as the hero of the famous Karbala battle, which occurred between the party of Al-Hussien Ibn Ali, grandson of the prophet Muhammed and Yazid Ibn Umayya. Sayeda Zeinab was spotted protecting the women, soothing the injured, and protecting the bodies of the dead. She lost her brother Al-Hussien in this battle but managed to spare the life of his son Ali Zein Al-Abdein, a child back then.

After losing this battle, her staying in Al-Madina became a real threat to the Umayyads after they seized the caliphate and killed Al-Hussien and almost all of Prophet Muhammed’s descendants (Ahl al-Bayt). Consequently, Sayeda Zeinab, the representative of the Ahl al-Bayt had to choose their exile. She chose Egypt, arriving in modern-day Cairo in year 61 of Hijra.

When she came to Egypt with her family, almost all Egyptians came out to greet her. She was greatly honoured by the Egyptian people who visited her and consulted her constantly on her premises at Qanater Al-Sibaa (The Lions Barrages ), approximately the current location of El-Sayeda Zeinab’s mosque and mausoleum.

According to Ali Pasha Mubarak’s series Al-Khetat Al-Tawfiqia, ” Sayeda Zeinab Street was named after Sayeda Zeinab, daughter of Imam Ali, bless be upon him, because this is where her mausoleum is situated in a golden copper compartment with an embroidery silk cover underneath a high dome that is situated inside Al-Zainabi mosque near Qanater Al-Sibaa. The mosque was renovated by Prince Ali Pasha Al-Wazir in 955. Then, it was renovated and enlarged during the reign of Prince Abdel-Rahman Katkhuda in 1173. The mosque is always full of visitors. A Hadra (Sufi ritual of praising God’s presence) is held every Sunday night, and a Maqraa ( A night of reading the Quran) is held every Wednesday night. The mosque also witnesses the celebration of her Moulid (her ascension) every year,” reads the book.

Touched by the emotions of Egyptians, Sayeda Zeinab is said to have blessed Egypt, saying:  ” O People of Egypt, you stood by us, may God stand by you, you were our refuge, may God be yours, you helped us, may God always help you out of all difficulties. “

She died in year 62 of Hijra, with conflicting stories surrounding her burial. Some say she was buried in Madina. Others say she was buried in Egypt. But the fact remains that she came to Egypt and that her presence is still felt, appreciated and celebrated. People still refer to her for spiritual guidance.

Her annual moulid, one of the largest and most iconic, takes place on the 28th of Ragab in the Hijri year.

source/content: english.ahram.org.eg (headline edited)

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Egyptians walk outside Cairo’s Sayeda Zainab mosque during celebrations marking the birthday of Prophet Mohamed s granddaughter Zeinab, late on February 14, 2023. AFP

Egypt celebrates moulid of Sayeda Zeinab

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EGYPT / SAUDI ARABIA

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: UAE’s Minister for Foreign Trade Dr. Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi Elected as Chair of WTO’s 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13)

The General Council of the WTO has elected Dr. Thani bin Ahmed Al Zeyoudi, Minister of State for Foreign Trade, as Chair of the World Trade Organisation’s 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13).

The Ministerial Conference, attended by leading representatives from the 164 countries and customs blocs that make up the WTO, will take place in Abu Dhabi in February 2024.

MC13 comes at a critical time for world trade, and the conference will build on the outcomes of MC12, review the performance of the multilateral trading system, make decisions on the future work of the WTO, and set up the roadmap for MC14.

“This is a pivotal moment for world trade,” commented Al Zeyoudi. “As a Ministerial Conference, we have to tackle pressing issues and challenges, consider all the forces shaping the future of trade and come up with clear solutions, and challenge ourselves to take actionable decisions that move the needle on making trade more efficient, inclusive and sustainable.

“At the heart of all of this is the need to modernise trade and embed technology across supply chains, and we look forward to working closely with all the members of the WTO to make real progress at MC13. Our goal must be driving forward momentum for more change at the conference in Abu Dhabi next year, but also in the years to come, and I have the utmost confidence in our collective ability to make this happen.”

The announcement was made during the WTO General Council in Geneva, Switzerland, where he met with the WTO Director-General, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala.

During their meeting they discussed the preparations for MC13, in addition to the landmark inclusion of trade as a thematic day at COP28, which is set to take place in Dubai later this year.

Dr. Thani delivered his first address as Chair at the General Council, where he stressed the importance of building resilient trade frameworks to tackle today’s challenging landscape.

In his address, he called for focused and decisive deliberations amongst WTO members ahead of MC13, and commented, “Trade policy extends far beyond the scope of trade itself; it is about shaping our common future. It is our collective responsibility to contribute to a predictable, rules-based, and open trade and investment environment that creates prosperity for all – and this is precisely why the success of MC13 is so imperative.”

source/content: wam.ae (headline edited)

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (U.A.E)

LEBANON: Fady Dagher the Lebanese Immigrant Who’s Risen to become Montreal’s Police Chief

Fady Dagher is the first minority-background officer to head Canada’s second-largest force.

A map of Lebanon hangs in Chief Fady Dagher’s office in the grey stone headquarters of Montreal’s police force. It is a constant reminder of where he is from and the place he hopes to return to.

“For me, it helps me to stay connected to my roots and not to forget where I come from,” Mr Dagher said.

The 55-year-old Lebanese-Canadian officer, who moved to Canada when he was 17, is the first person from a minority background to lead Montreal police in the force’s nearly 200-year history.

His appointment in January was the culmination of a lifetime of service to his adopted homeland.

“I always felt I had a debt to the Montreal community,” Mr Dagher told The National. “They welcomed me so well and it was a duty for me to serve them.”

Softly spoken with a slightly gravelly voice, Mr Dagher said that when he came to Canada in 1985 his original plan was to go to university and then return to Abidjan in the Ivory Coast, where his father ran a manufacturing company. But a chance encounter with a police officer drew him to a different life, despite strong opposition from his father.

“Oh my God, he lost it,” Mr Dagher recalled with a chuckle.

Not even an unplanned trip from his beloved father could dissuade Mr Dagher from pursuing a career in law enforcement.

“I didn’t see my father from 1985 to 1991 and he came right away to discourage me.”

While policing may not have held the same allure and status in Lebanon and Ivory Coast as it did in Canada, Mr Dagher has brought the values of both places to his role leading Montreal’s nearly 5,000 officers.

“In Lebanon and Africa, we really have the community spirit deep in us and in the police, if you don’t have the community spirit, you cannot be close to the community and you cannot find your resolve to apply the law,” he said.

Mr Dagher has championed a community approach that involves immersing officers in the neighbourhoods they patrol.

The police chief leads by example. Earlier this year, he spent five days living and sleeping at various Montreal homeless shelters to better understand the struggles faced by the city’s homeless population.

“There is no way you can lead without walking the talk,” Mr Dagher said.

At the heart of his approach to policing is a Lebanese ethos.

“I want to be able to be inside those houses, sit with them, cook with them, clean with them, eat with them and see what their stories are,” he said.

He is hoping he can help to transform a police force that is facing a severe shortage of personnel and a city grappling with a sharp rise in gun violence.

Mr Dagher estimated that the force is 20 per cent to 30 per cent short of the officers it needs. A huge part of his first few months on the job has been to go on a charm offensive trying to attract new recruits.

“That’s my first priority,” he said. “To be able to recruit and to keep the recruit is huge.”

He’s looking at immigrant communities and hoping his own career can help new Canadians see a potential future in the ranks of the Service de Police de la Ville de Montreal.

Like many cities across North America, Montreal recorded a sharp increase in violent crime during the pandemic, a trend that continued in 2022.

Mr Dagher said the force was actively looking at ways to reverse that trend and was optimistic it would.

In terms of gun violence, “last year was the worst year that we went through”, he said, but noted that since he took over in January gun violence appears to be down, a trend he hopes will continue through to the end of the year.

Mr Dagher, who signed a seven-year contract, is determined to help recharge the department, but he dreams of having one more professional act after he retires.

“I am hoping that one day I will finish my career as ambassador of Canada in Lebanon, so I can go back to where I come from,” he said.

It would be the cherry on top of an exceptional life and allow Mr Dagher to spend time closer to his ancestral village of Bikfaya in the Mount Lebanon region.

Even while he is busy leading Canada’s second-largest police force, his mind and heart are never far from the small Mediterranean country that generations of Daghers have called home.

Throughout his busy career, he said, Lebanon has always held a restorative power.

“Every time I go back to Lebanon my heart beats better, again and again. My heart is in good health when I go to Lebanon because I feel welcomed,” he said.

source/content: thenationalnews.com (headline edited)

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CANADIAN / LEBANESE

GCC – Central Asia Summit, Jeddah, July 19th 2023

Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman welcomed on Wednesday the heads of delegations participating in a summit of Gulf Cooperation Council and Central Asian countries.

Participants in the Jeddah summit include the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

From the GCC side, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the Crown Prince of Kuwait Sheikh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Vice President of the UAE Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid are attending.

Oman and Bahrain’s rulers are being represented by Sayyid Asaad bin Tariq Al-Said and Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa respectively.

Sheikh Nasser praised the active role played by the Kingdom in enhancing cooperation and coordination among GCC countries and consolidating friendship and joint cooperation with other countries.

source/content: arabnews.com (headline edited)

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SAUDI ARABIA / GCC STATES

ARAB / EGYPT: 5th ‘Arab Parliament General Session’ kicks off at Arab League HQ in Cairo

The fifth general session of the Arab Parliament, under Speaker Adel al Asoomi, kicked off on Saturday at the Arab League’s General Secretariat headquarters in Cairo.

The session is set to discuss a number of issues, including political and security developments in the Arab region.

The session will also debate an economic file on a bill to increase renewable and clean energy investments in the Arab world.

The lawmakers are set to discuss preparations for holding the second edition of the Arab forum on strengthening economic integration among Arab countries.

The parliament will consider a report on the social situation in the Arab world and will discuss enacting a law to counter bullying and family violence in the Arab region. 

source/content: egypttoday.com (headline edited)

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pix: moroccotelegraph.com

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ARAB / EGYPT

SAUDI ARABIA: Lamia Bint Majed Al Saud Reappointed UN-Habitat Goodwill Ambassador for Arab States

Her Royal Highness (HRH), Princess Lamia Bint Majed Al Saud, the Secretary General of Alwaleed Philanthropies, was reappointed as the UN-Habitat Goodwill Ambassador for the Arab region for a second term during a meeting held at the UN-Habitat premises in Riyadh.

As the first ever UN-Habitat Goodwill Ambassador for the Arab region appointed in 2020, HRH shed the light on key urban issues through her engagement with UN-Habitat activities and events, including the tenth session of the World Urban Forum 2020 and World Habitat Day Global Observance 2020.

HRH further advocated for topics, including Cities free from Violence against Women and Girls and COIVID-19 response in urban areas, as well as supported resource mobilization for a number of projects, targeting housing for the most vulnerable groups, COVID-19 response and climate action, spanning Iraq, Palestine, Sudan, Yemen, and Tunisia.

“I am greatly honoured to have been appointed for the second time as the UN-Habitat Regional Goodwill Ambassador for the Arab world. Our partnership with UN-Habitat will support our efforts to address issues around urbanization and its implications on societies, economies and environments. We promise to continue building bridges for a more compassionate, tolerant and accepting future along with our key partners.”

HRH signed her appointment letter in the presence of Maimunah Mohd Sharif, UN-Habitat Executive Director, Erfan Ali, UN-Habitat Regional Representative for the Arab States and Ayman El-Hefnawi, UN-Habitat Head of Office in Saudi Arabia.

“In the past three years during UN-Habitat’s cooperation with HRH Princess Lamia bint Majid Al Saud as UN-Habitat’s regional Goodwill Ambassador, HRH has shown the utmost commitment to the advocacy for the UN-Habitat mandate to realise more sustainable, resilient and inclusive cities,” Sharif commented.

UN-Habitat is keen on continuing the cooperation with HRH for the years 2022, 2023 and beyond in all relevant areas, including climate action, urban crisis response, housing and advocating the realization of better cities for all. 

source/content: see.news (headline edited)

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SAUDI ARABIA

SAUDI ARABIA: ‘Mawhiba’ Nurtures 606 Gifted Students under its ‘Gifted Arabs’ Initiative in 16 Arab countries

  • Mawhiba representatives told the 13th Conference of Arab Ministers of Education in Rabat that its ‘Gifted Arabs’ initiative had identified and was supporting people in 16 Arab countries
  • Secretary-General Dr. Amal bint Abdullah Al-Hazaa said that the program allows Saudi leadership to share their expertise and discover, nurture, and empower talent around the Arab world

More than 600 ‘gifted’ students have been granted support to realize their academic talents under an initiative launched by a Saudi foundation, an education conference has been told.

Leaders from Mawhiba, or the King Abdulaziz and his Companions Foundation for Giftedness and Creativity, Mawhiba, told the 13th Conference of Arab Ministers of Education in Rabat, Morocco, that its ‘Gifted Arabs’ initiative had identified and was supporting people in 16 Arab countries.

Secretary-General Dr. Amal bint Abdullah Al-Hazaa said that the program allows Saudi leadership to share their expertise and discover, nurture, and empower talent around the Arab world.

Dr. Khaled Al-Sharif, director general of Mawhiba’s Center of Excellence, said that 606 students were identified in the first and second rounds of the ‘Gifted Arabs’ initiative’s recruitment.

The initiative has provided the talented students with qualitative enrichment and academic programs to develop their knowledge and capabilities, he added.

Mawhiba said that its efforts were part of its vision to empower talent and creativity to further prosperity.

The conference, “Future of Education in the Arab World in the Digital Transformation Era,” was held on May 29 and 30.

source/contents: arabnews.com (headline edited)

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Mawhiba has grant aided 606 students under its ‘Gifted Arabs’ initiative. (SPA)

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SAUDI ARABIA / ARAB WORLD

PALESTINIAN-BRITISH: Why UK Politician Layla Moran brought the Keffiyeh to the Mother of Parliaments

In our continuing series of inspiring life stories across continents, we hear how the British MP is guided by a proud Jerusalem heritage.

Layla Moran’s earliest and fondest memories are of listening to tales of the days when the Ottomans ruled Palestine.

With a child’s fascination for the grisly aspects of life, she absorbed one particular story told of her great-grandfather’s first job accompanying the tax collectors. “They went to a village where someone hadn’t paid their taxes,” Ms Moran relates. “The man was dragged along the ground by his scrotum by a horse because he hadn’t paid his dues. And this was all under the draconian Ottoman rule.”

The first-hand accounts of her great-grandfather, the composer, oud player, poet and chronicler Wasif Jawhariyyeh, were published in his celebrated memoirs that span an extraordinary period for Palestine, from Ottoman rule to the 30-year British mandate and the formation of Israel.

As a young girl, Ms Moran devoured every word, finding a deep connection to her Palestinian heritage.

Those roots have at times come to the fore in her role as the first British-Palestinian Member of Parliament and as the Liberal Democrats’ shadow foreign secretary. Vividly so when she appeared in the House of Commons with a keffiyeh, a Palestinian scarf, wrapped around her neck, the first worn by an MP in the chamber.

Ms Moran explains that she wasn’t striving to make a statement, it was just that she’d had another impassioned discussion the night before about the plight of the Palestinians with her mother, who was born in Jerusalem.

“The next morning, I opened the drawer and saw the scarf. I thought, ‘I’m going to wear it for her and I’m going to wear it for us’ because it’s so much part of our identity,” she tells The National.

It was only afterwards that she realised the full impact of what she had done when friends texted their commendations alongside the inevitable social media storm.

he owes much to her mother’s side of the family, not least her love of Arabic culture and language along with a willingness to be outspoken and what she confesses can be passionate gesticulations.

The influence of her mother, particularly from those youthful days of protest during the 1970 Jordanian unrest, is obvious. Randa Jawhariyyeh was living in Amman and would often slip out to show support for the Palestinian cause, and it was Israel’s proposed annexation of the West Bank that they had been talking about the night before Ms Moran wore the scarf in September last year.

“She’ll talk about it emotionally, but she won’t cry,” she says. “She just passionately insists that Palestine is not about lines on a map, it’s about people.”

Though born in London, Ms Moran is proud of being a “Jerusalemite” of many generations’ heritage. Indeed, the Greek Orthodox family bible, signed in Arabic by every firstborn child of her Palestinian Christian antecedents, is a repository of names going back two centuries.

“It confounds people that I am not Muslim because they associate Palestine with Islam,” she says. “Then I point out that Jesus was born there and they go ‘oh, yes’ … It shows that the basic makeup of who is a Palestinian is very poorly understood internationally.”

The city at the confluence of the three major Abrahamic religions in Jerusalem has generated a rich and deep history; more than half a century of which was captured in the memoirs of Ms Moran’s great-grandfather.

Jawhariyyeh recounted one period of relatively peaceful intermingling of Muslim, Christian and Jew between the two World Wars. He was a Christian but studied the Koran and counted many Muslims — Turks included — as well as the Europeans, as friends. His diaries refer to Jews as “abna’ al-balad”, meaning compatriots.

He was, by all accounts, an engaging and charismatic man who socialised with all, no matter their background.

His many sayings were repeated at home and passed down the generations. “Money doesn’t matter, all that matters is beauty” is one that trips off Ms Moran’s tongue with a smile as she speaks by Zoom from her London apartment. “He was writing those diaries from the perspective of someone intensely proud of his homeland,” she says.

While Jawhariyyeh walked in the steps of many powerful men and worked for the British mandate, he never lost the enjoyment of speaking to ordinary people. There was one occasion when he visited Ms Moran’s grandfather in Libya during which he was “lost” for three hours after becoming engrossed in conversation with a bin-man he’d met on the street.

“People are people, and that’s where the joy in life is”, Jawhariyyeh frequently said, according to Ms Moran. “I think that very much carried through in a lot of the way my family sees the world.”

Perhaps this is why she takes offence that her elevation to becoming an MP might somehow make her superior to others. “It has never been about me, or status or how other people see me,” she says. “And if they see me in a way that is in any way elevated above them, that makes me very uncomfortable. I do everything I do out of a sense of duty to others.”

That sense of public service comes from both sides of the family. Ms Moran’s father, James, is a notable diplomat who served as the European Union’s ambassador to Egypt, among other countries

Hence, the young Layla spent a privileged childhood jumping around various states from Jordan to Ethiopia and Jamaica.

“I am British, I am Palestinian, but actually I spent the whole of my childhood living in other countries than those two,” she reflects. “So I’m very much what they call a third-culture kid, without geographic roots.”

Her upbringing meant that she had many encounters with “these extraordinary people” who came to the house. The then prime minister of Jamaica, she recalls, was among those who felt comfortable enough to take part in a good party.

“I’d meet presidents and ambassadors and see them to be normal people,” Ms Moran says.

Her parents also insisted that the fabulous homes with swimming pools and staff were “borrowed”, so “don’t have airs and graces”.

Having been imbued with Arab and Middle Eastern culture, Ms Moran puts that to good effect in the Commons to inform and educate other MPs on the region. “The best thing I can do is to tell the story of my family and that will inject an element of humanity into the conversation that hopefully will make people stop and listen,” she says.

It is those times, she believes, when she has the greatest effect, even if her mother worries that people will judge her for it. “Don’t say too much that you’re Palestinian,” Randa would chide. “You’re British and you are a British MP, and you just happen to have a Palestinian mother.”

Her mother has long had great concerns for the welfare of Ms Moran. In the Gulf War of 1991, when the family was in Athens, she kept nine-year-old Layla off school out of fears that the conflict would spill over into Greece.

Given how much politics was discussed around the kitchen table and her time in the region, the 38-year-old MP is confident about her understanding of the Middle East’s complexities. “I can speak with real authority about the region,” she says.

Some of that heritage has been digested in more ways than one, with Ms Moran claiming a skilled hand at Middle Eastern cuisine. She says she makes a mean Moulokhia that wards off cold British nights and gives her apartment an Arab-influenced aroma, especially pleasant after a hard day spent toiling over foreign affairs.

“But there’s a difference between being a Palestinian girl who likes to eat Palestinian food and listens to Arabic music, and being a spokesperson about what are very complex issues in the area. And I’m very careful when I tread on to the latter ground,” she says, in reference to the post she’s held since August. “I’m taking it slowly because I want to get it right.”

Her presence in the Commons is a clear reminder to others that Britain has a history, a legacy and responsibility to the Palestinians. She points out that it was the British mandate that governed the area for 30 years after the First World War, giving way to the formation of Israel.

“We can’t just give up on the region,” she says. “Britain is integral to its history. I’m not saying we can solve all of its problems on our own. We absolutely cannot but we certainly can’t throw our hands up and go away.”

Again, the conversation comes back to Jawhariyyeh’s diaries, in which he initially expressed joy at working under the British rule. “There was elation in his words at the arrival of the British because they freed them from the Ottoman Empire, but at the end my great-grandfather felt that the British who he had worked for utterly betrayed the Palestinians, because they promised that they were going to do good by them.”

Despite attending Roedean boarding school in Sussex, mainly because of her father’s transient life as a diplomat, Ms Moran went into politics to address the unfairness she witnessed in the British education system as a secondary school teacher in maths and physics.

She decided to do something about it and read every major party’s manifesto on education, deeming that the Liberal Democrats most closely fitted her own beliefs.

In the 2017 General Election, she took the Oxford West and Abingdon seat from the Conservatives by just 816 votes. Her straightforward and egalitarian views appear to have held sway with her constituents.

In the last election, her majority increased by almost 9,000 votes. Observers of events at the House of Commons, it seems, will have the chance of seeing that Palestinian scarf for some years to come.

source/content: thenationalnews.com (headline edited)

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‘I do everything I do out of sense of duty to others,’ says Layla Moran of her decision to become a Liberal Democrat politician. She won the seat of Oxford West and Abingdon in 2017. Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

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BRITISH / PALESTINIAN

MARCH 15th, 2023 : UN observes First International Day against Islamophobia

The United Nations on Friday commemorated the first-ever International Day to Combat Islamophobia with a special event in the General Assembly Hall, where speakers upheld the need for concrete action in the face of rising hatred, discrimination and violence against Muslims. 

The observation follows the unanimous adoption of an Assembly resolution last year that proclaimed 15 March as the International Day, calling for global dialogue that promotes tolerance, peace and respect for human rights and religious diversity. 

As the UN Secretary-General stated, the nearly two billion Muslims worldwide – who come from all corners of the planet – “reflect humanity in all its magnificent diversity”. Yet, they often face bigotry and prejudice simply because of their faith. 

Furthermore, Muslim women can also suffer “triple discrimination” because of their gender, ethnicity, and faith. 

Islamophobia ‘epidemic’ 

The high-level event was co-convened by Pakistan, whose Foreign Minister, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, underlined that Islam is a religion of peace, tolerance and pluralism.

Although Islamophobia is not new, he said it is “a sad reality of our times” that is only increasing and spreading. 

“Since the tragedy of 9/11, animosity and institutional suspicion of Muslims and Islam across the world have only escalated to epidemic proportions. A narrative has been developed and peddled which associates Muslim communities and their religion with violence and danger,” said Mr. Zardari, who is also Chair of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Council of Foreign Ministers. 

“This Islamophobic narrative is not just confined to extremist, marginal propaganda, but regrettably has found acceptance by sections of mainstream media, academia, policymakers and state machinery,” he added. 

Everyone has a role 

The President of the UN General Assembly, Csaba Kőrösi, noted that Islamophobia is rooted in xenophobia, or the fear of strangers, which is reflected in discriminatory practices, travel bans, hate speech, bullying and targeting of other people. 

He urged countries to uphold freedom of religion or belief, which is guaranteed under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 

“All of us carry a responsibility to challenge Islamophobia or any similar phenomenon, to call out injustice and condemn discrimination based on religion or belief – or the lack of them,” he added. 

Mr. Kőrösi said education is key to learning why these phobias exist, and it can be “transformative” in changing how people understand each another. 

Hatred on the rise 

The growing hate that Muslims face is not an isolated development, UN Secretary-General António Guterres told attendees. 

“It is an inexorable part of the resurgence of ethno-nationalism, neo-Nazi white supremacist ideologies, and violence targeting vulnerable populations including Muslims, Jews, some minority Christian communities and others,” he said. 

“Discrimination diminishes us all. And it is incumbent on all of us to stand up against it. We must never be bystanders to bigotry.” 

Stressing that “we must strengthen our defenses”, Mr. Guterres highlighted UN measures such as a Plan of Action to Safeguard Religious Sites.  He also called for ramping up political, cultural, and economic investments in social cohesion. 

Curb online bigotry 

“And we must confront bigotry wherever and whenever it rears its ugly head. This includes working to tackle the hate that spreads like wildfire across the internet,” he added. 

To this end, the UN is working with governments, regulators, technology companies and the media “to set up guardrails, and enforce them.” 

Compassion and solidarity 

Other policies already launched include a Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, and the Our Common Agenda report, which outlines a framework for a more inclusive and secure “digital future” for all people. 

The Secretary-General also expressed gratitude to religious leaders across the world who have united to promote dialogue and interfaith harmony. 

He described the 2019 declaration on ‘Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together’ – co-authored by His Holiness Pope Francis and His Eminence the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Sheikh Ahmed El Tayeb – as “a model for compassion and human solidarity.” 

source/content: news.un.org/en/ (headline edited)

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UN Photo/Loey Felipe / Secretary-General António Guterres addresses the UN General Assembly High-Level Event to commemorate the International Day to Combat Islamophobia.

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UNITED NATIONS / U.N.